Compliance
EB provides privacy-preserving compliance for regulated stablecoins. The key principle: no single party can unilaterally decrypt transaction data—not even the protocol developers.
The EB Approach
| Traditional | EB |
|---|---|
| Trusted escrow holds decryption keys | No single party has keys |
| Central authority can surveil | m-of-n guardians required |
| "Trust us" privacy | Cryptographic guarantees |
| All-or-nothing access | Per-transaction decryption |
What's Visible by Default
Layer 2 (Encrypted Balances)
Alice sends to Bob
Visible:
✓ Sender: Alice's address
✓ Recipient: Bob's address
✓ Token: ebUSD
✓ Time
Hidden:
✗ Amount (ElGamal encrypted)
For KYC/AML: Addresses are visible. You can see who transacted with whom.
For amounts: Requires UKRC threshold decryption (see below).
Layer 3 (Anonymous Staking)
Alice stakes → [commitment pool] → Bob unstakes
Visible:
✓ Stake created by some address
✓ Unstake happened to some address
✗ Cannot link stake to unstake
Hidden:
✗ Amount
✗ Who → who connection
Full privacy—both addresses and amounts hidden.
UKRC Threshold Decryption
When a legal order requires amount disclosure:
- Request goes to guardians (e.g., 5 independent entities)
- Each guardian reviews the legal basis independently
- m-of-n must agree (e.g., 3-of-5)
- Combine partial decryptions → plaintext revealed
- Event logged for audit
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ THRESHOLD DECRYPTION │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ │
│ Court Order: "Decrypt TX_123" │
│ │
│ Guardian 1: Reviews → Approves → partial_1 │
│ Guardian 2: Reviews → Approves → partial_2 │
│ Guardian 3: Reviews → Approves → partial_3 │
│ Guardian 4: Reviews → Declines │
│ Guardian 5: Not needed (3-of-5 reached) │
│ │
│ Combine: partial_1 + partial_2 + partial_3 = plaintext │
│ │
│ Result: {sender, recipient, amount} for TX_123 only │
│ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Critical properties:
- No single guardian can decrypt alone
- No mass surveillance—each tx needs separate order
- Decryption is logged and auditable
- Guardians can decline frivolous requests
What Gets Revealed
| Scenario | Visible | Needs UKRC |
|---|---|---|
| L2 transfer | Sender, recipient | Amount only |
| L2 via stealth | Sender visible | Recipient + amount |
| L3 stake/unstake | Some activity | Everything |
| Public transfer | Everything | Nothing |
When UKRC Is Triggered
UKRC is designed for legal compliance only:
- Court subpoena
- Regulatory investigation
- Law enforcement request
- Tax authority inquiry
Not for:
- Curious observers
- Business intelligence
- Competitor analysis
- Protocol developers
Enforcement Actions
Blacklist
Block an address from all operations:
Blacklisted address cannot:
✗ Send or receive (any layer)
✗ Shield or unshield
✗ Stake or unstake
Freeze
Block outgoing only:
Frozen address cannot:
✗ Send
✗ Shield
✗ Create stakes
Frozen address CAN:
✓ Receive (allows investigation)
Comparison
| System | Address Privacy | Amount Privacy | Legal Access | Backdoor |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EB | L2: Visible, L3: Hidden | Always hidden | UKRC (m-of-n) | No |
| Tornado | Hidden | Hidden | None | No |
| CBDC | Visible | Visible | Central bank | Yes |
| Bank | Visible | Visible | With warrant | Yes |
Summary
EB's compliance model provides:
- Privacy by default — Amounts always encrypted
- Visible addresses — L2 supports standard KYC/AML
- No backdoors — Threshold decryption, not single-party
- Legal access — Courts can compel decryption via guardians
- Proportionality — Only specific transactions, not mass surveillance
- Transparency — All decryptions are logged
For technical details on the UKRC threshold decryption protocol, contact the team.